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ARTICLE
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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyse a set of socially responsible investment
(SRI) indices against their conventional counterparts in the US con-
text. Using a data set that spans the Obama and Trump adminis-
trations, we aim to identify whether performance and volatility
patterns differ when markets are exposed to political uncertainty
and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The findings suggest that SRI
indices underperform conventional indices, and that the S&P 500
has a significant impact on their behaviour. The CBOE’s Volatility
Index (VIX), the US Equity Related Economic Uncertainty Index
(EEUi) and the impact of the economic policy uncertainty index
(EPUi) are used to consider market volatility and political uncer-
tainty, with VIX emerging as the best indicator to capture market
uncertainty. The study signals a positive and significant impact on
SRI indices during the first hundred days of the Obama administra-
tion with a lack of significant findings for the Trump administration
for the period of study. The results for implied volatility reveal
similar patterns across all indices.
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1. Introduction
The concept of ethical investment can be traced as far back as 1602, when the Dutch East
India Company faced boycotts from religious institutions because of its involvement in
the trade of slaves. Later, in the 1920s, churches in the US began to apply faith-based
criteria to exclude certain investments from their investment portfolio, such as businesses
in the alcohol or tobacco industries. As such, socially responsible investment is not a new
concept to the investment community, but recent interest in ethical investment dates to
the early 1980s, when investors in the US began to screen their investments according to
environmental, social and political criteria. By the 1990s, ethical investment had become
popular and many investment companies launched a variety of ethically based invest-
ment products. Ethical investment entails a screening process in which stock shares are
excluded or included on ethical, social or environmental grounds; the main idea is to “do
good” by investing in portfolios that align with moral and ethical values. In general,
socially responsible investment (SRI) aims to combine investors’ objectives with their
commitment to social concerns. Thus, stocks would be selected by combining
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conventional financial criteria with ethical screening. Accordingly, SRI funds are formed
by screening investment portfolios for particular social, ethical and/or environmental
issues. However, is it coherent for investors to lose sight of their primary objective to
invest successfully, namely, to obtain good returns for the level of risk taken? Should
investors accept low investment returns or renounce a properly diversified portfolio for
the sake of feeling good about their investment? This is a personal decision with a high
emotional component, and the idea of investing in a socially responsible manner appears
to be very appealing to certain investors with social mind-sets, but the concept is also
quite ambiguous. Moreover, this type of investment experiences the same ups and downs
as any other, and companies might claim to be socially responsible when in fact they are
not. What, then, is the real power of ethical investment?
Ethical investment has evolved over the years and can no longer be considered a tiny
niche market, as one out of every five dollars under professional management in the US
follows some form of SRI strategy (US SIF, 2016). In 2016, sustainable, responsible and
impact investing registered a 33% growth on its 2014 performance, and a 14-fold increase
since 1995. The total of US-domiciled assets under management using SRI assets
managed with ESG (environment, social issues and governance) totals $8.72 trillion
(US SIF Foundation, 2016). There appears to be no limit to the continuous growth in
the sector, and as a result, investors seem to be considering environment, social and
governance issues when designing their strategies.
Considering the growing importance of SRI, this study considers the analysis of
systemic risk and implications for SRI by looking at the impact of the economic policy
uncertainty index (EPUi), implied volatility index (VIX) and the US Equity Related
Economic Uncertainty Index (EEUi). Policy uncertainty has an impact on the effective-
ness of policy intervention across the overall economy, and as such it is a major factor in
the investment decision-making process (Tsai, 2017). Since the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis, research on economic uncertainty has increased, motivating Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2012a) to develop the EPU index. The index is grounded on three components:
data from news reports on economic policy uncertainty in ten leading US newspapers;
weighted and properly discounted tax code provisions; and disagreement from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters measured by calculating the interquartile ranges of
individual forecasters’ expectations of the consumer price index and purchases of goods
and services by the federal, state, and local governments.
The review of the extant literature reveals a significant amount of research explor-
ing the effects of EPU on a variety of economic and financial issues. For example,
Zhang, Han, Pan, and Huang (2015) examined EPU implications in the context of
corporate governance. Wang, Chen, and Huang (2014) looked at the impact of
economic uncertainty on investment behaviour, while Scheffel (2015) explored issues
related to economic development. Monetary policy effects, commodity markets, stock
price behaviour and market volatility were studied by Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola
(2013), Ko and Lee (2015), Li et al. (2015) and Scrabic and Soric (2017) , respectively.
Interestingly, there is no evidence of any research combining the analysis of SRI
behaviour in the US during the first hundred days of a new administration and the
economic and financial uncertainty associated with this initial period. Consequently,
the present study contributes to this literature by incorporating Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2015) EPU and EEU indices to measure economic and market uncertainty.
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This approach combined with the study of implied volatility; provide a suitable
research framework in which to determine whether SRIs show stability patterns in
the context of the Global Financial Crisis and during the first hundred days of the
Obama and Trump administrations. The interest in the Obama and Trump adminis-
trations is motivated by mixed findings in the literature on this question. On the one
hand, stock markets seem to prefer Democrat presidents over Republicans (Belo, Gala,
& Jun, 2011; Santa-Clara & Valkanov, 2003), whereas, popular wisdom holds just the
opposite, signalling a positive stock market reaction to Republican presidents rather
than Democrats (Jones & Banning, 2009). The question then arises of whether SRIs
show a preference for the president’s political party, and to what extent SRI would
exhibit more stable patterns during times of sustained economic and political
uncertainty.
The novel contribution of the paper lies in the careful analysis of SRI and conven-
tional indices in the context of the first hundred days of a new administration in the
US, as this type of analysis has not been considered by the extant literature as yet. The
study is based on four augmented market models that is complemented by a causality
frequency domain approach that seeks to determine whether economic policy uncer-
tainty, implied volatility and systemic risk have a significant impact on the performance
of the selected indices. To our knowledge, this is the first study of its type, and as such
makes a clear and significant contribution to the existing literature on SRI index
performance. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section presents
a brief overview of the research on the political cycle and implications for investment
portfolios. The third section outlines the data and the research methodology. The
fourth section reports the main findings and offers a critical assessment of the results
and their implications. Section five concludes the analysis and makes some suggestions
for further research.
2. Literature review
According to the basic principles of portfolio theory, investors look for portfolios
that maximise their returns, while at the time minimising their risk exposure,
allowing them to receive the best possible return on their investment. However, a
pertinent question concerns the potential price that investors might pay for selecting
socially responsible investments. Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang (2008) investigated
under- and over-performance hypotheses for every SRI fund in the world, finding
that SRI funds in the US, the UK and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific
countries underperform their domestic benchmarks by −2.2% to −6.5%. These
authors showed that except for some countries (such as France, Japan and
Sweden), the risk adjusted returns of SRI funds were not statistically different from
the performance of conventional funds. These findings suggest that investors’ pre-
ference for ethical investment does not seem to have a notable impact on their final
return, and rather than materialising gains from the conscious investment approach
they might end up being penalised. To examine this issue further, the following
section explores the main research findings that have recently been reported in the
field and that clearly show controversies regarding the benefits of investing in SRI
funds.
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2.1. The performance of socially responsible funds
The socially responsible investment (SRI) literature, together with the SRI industry, has
experienced rapid growth in the past twenty years, attracting interest from analysts and
academics alike. One particular aspect of interest among individual and private investors,
concerns the link between SRI and ethical values, environmental protection, improved
social conditions and good governance (Revelli & Viviani, 2015). Over the past decade,
research has focused on analysing SRI performance to determine whether the financial
costs associated with SRI investment are significantly different from those associated with
conventional investments, and whether they have a significant effect on the financial and/or
market performance of portfolios that follow an SRI strategy. According to Hamilton, Jo,
and Statman (1993), SRI has captivated some investors by incorporating a “feel good” factor
into their investment decisions, as its main objective is to invest and generate returns while
taking into consideration ethical and responsible activities. However, ethical investments
that consider moral values as part of the investment process seem to bear an additional cost
in terms of portfolio performance. The reason for this is that SRIs may be considered to be
less-diversified portfolios, which as a result yield lower returns and are exposed to non-
diversification risks. The literature on this question is inconclusive with some studies
suggesting that SRIs perform less well than conventional portfolios and others finding
SRI investments outperforming conventional portfolios (e.g., Alam & Rajjaque, 2010;
Consolandi, Jaiswal-Dale, Poggiani, & Vercelli, 2009; Fernandez-Izquierdo & Matallin-
Saez, 2008; Gil-Bazo, Ruiz-Verdu, & Santos, 2009; Lyn & Zychowicz, 2010).
Recent research interest seems to be shifting to the debate on whether SRI funds and
indices are more profitable than conventional investments. Researchers have not man-
aged to reach consensus on how SRI funds perform, and ambiguity on the performance
of SRI remains an open question. Another issue arises out of this debate and involves
discussions examining the similarity in performance of SRI and conventional invest-
ments, namely, whether there is a real interest among companies to take on greater
environmental and social responsibility when addressing their stakeholders’ expecta-
tions. Most of the literature has analysed SRI fund performance in individual countries,
with the US and the UK appearing to dominate the field. For example, Hamilton et al.
(1993), Goldreyer and Diltz (1999), and Bello (2005) looked at SRI performance in the
US, finding that it is not significantly different from that of non-SRI funds. In contrast,
Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2003) reported that the financial costs associated with SRI
screens can be substantial; more specifically, financial costs can impose constraints of
more than 1.5% per month on investors who put their trust in managers’ asset selection
skills. The evidence for the UK (Luther, Matatko, & Corner, 1992; Mallin, Saadouni, &
Briston, 1995; Gregory, Matatko, & Luther, 1997) concluded that the difference in
performance between SRI and non-SRI is not statistically different from zero.
Abdelsalam, Duygun, Matallin-Saez, and Tortosa-Ausina (2014) study of performance
persistence in Islamic and SRI mutual funds adopted a multi-stage strategy, using partial
frontier approaches to measure the sample funds’ performance. The main results indi-
cated performance persistence for some of the analysed funds. The authors found that
performance was particularly important during financial crises, as investors would be
looking for funds with a more stable performance, and that Islamic and SRI types of
funds seemed to have more stable patterns than conventional funds. The two types of
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funds were analysed together as they share social, ethical and financial objectives, and
both use negative screening (filtering) criteria in selecting stocks for their portfolios in
order to reflect these objectives (Forte & Miglietta, 2007).
The performance of sustainable investment in the context of the Global Financial
Crisis and market uncertainty was studied by Lean and Nguyen (2014), who reported
lower Sharpe ratios on sustainable portfolios than conventional portfolios. Their results
indicate that the Global Financial Crisis impacted sustainable investment return and
volatility, while the US policy uncertainty index was found to have a limited effect, as it
only seemed to impact on two of the regions examined (Asia Pacific and North America)
during the crisis period.
Gil-Bazo et al. (2009) analysed whether mutual funds constrained by an SRI strategy
underperform mutual funds that are free of this constraint. Their findings show that
rather than paying a price in the form of reduced performance, SRI mutual funds earned
a premium from the superior risk-adjusted performance relative to that of a similar
conventional fund. Furthermore, these authors found no conclusive evidence that SRI
funds charge higher fees. However, the SRI funds have a higher performance premium
than those of conventional funds, which is entirely due to the fact that SRI funds are
operated by management companies specialising in SRI funds. Indeed, when compared
to these highly specialised firms, SRI funds run by generalist companies will underper-
form conventional funds. The results highlight the importance of taking into account
management company characteristics and specialisation in SRI when investors are
selecting their SRI portfolio.
An analysis comparing the performance of SRI and conventional funds by Humphrey,
Warren, and Boon (2016) uncovered no meaningful differences on return estimates,
which were insignificant and small in economic terms. This study corroborates existing
evidence that investors can expect returns from SRI that are neither better nor worse than
those from conventional funds, findings that seem to refute the notion that SRI will
perform less well than conventional investments. Furthermore, Sturm and Field (2018)
concluded that conventional interpretation of SRI performance relative to benchmarks
for evaluating financial investment does not appear to be appropriate for certain SRIs as
they do not consider the opportunity cost. The reviewed literature offers evidence of the
lack of agreement among researchers regarding the positive attributes of SRI, with some
researchers supporting the idea of better performance associated with socially respon-
sible investments while others clearly question their benefits.
2.2. The US presidential cycle and socially responsible funds
There is a large amount of literature analysing the effect of elections on the performance
of financial markets. However, the study of socially responsible investment in the context
of presidents’ first hundred days in office has not been considered yet. The election of
Donald Trump as the 45th president of the USA was unexpected and was followed by a
strong reaction in US stock prices, as markets seemed to incorporate expectations of
economic growth and tax policy fairly quickly. Expectations among investors shifted
towards the belief that economic growth would be strengthened, corporate taxes would
fall and the climate for domestically oriented companies would be more favourable than
for those with substantial foreign involvement (Wagner, Zeckhauser, & Ziegler, 2017).
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These events need to be analysed and compared with the market reaction to the first
Obama administration as they might shed some light on how SRI responded to periods of
significant uncertainty, as Trump’s election was not expected and Obama took office in
the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, which made the first hundred days of his
administration quite uncertain, when compared to Trump’s economic and financial
climate.
Available research seems to consider the presidential cycle over its four years, with a
clear lack of attention to the first days in office of a new administration. For instance,
Sturm (2009) studied the impact of the US presidential election cycle, finding that
January holds greater predictive power during certain years of the president’s term in
office. Cooper, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2006) documented evidence indicating
that January returns have predictive power over returns for the remaining eleven months
of the year. In particular, positive (negative) January returns will dictate the patterns for
the remaining eleven months. These authors examined the presidential cycle and
reported that stock returns appear to be higher during Democratic than Republican
presidencies. The influence of the presidential party seems to be determined by variations
in fiscal policies across party lines that are not reflected by standard variables examining
the business cycle. The analysis of the US presidential cycle seems to focus on the study of
equity indices like the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial with very little examination of
how ethical investments behave during the early days of a new administration. The
identified research gap has motivated the development of this research paper, where its
main contributions to the literature can be identified as follows: i) the study offers initial
evidence on SRI performance by looking at SRI indices return and volatility patterns in
the context of political uncertainty in the US during the first hundred days of the Obama
and Trump administrations; ii) the research framework is supported by the incorpora-
tion of the VIX, EEU and the EPU indices, which measure political uncertainty and
market volatility; and iii) the study is developed in the context of four market models that
complemented by the frequency domain causality framework developed by Breitung and
Candelon (2006) seek to identify whether SRI indices are especially receptive to situations
where market uncertainty is at its highest.
3. Data and research methodology
The economic policy uncertainty index (EPUi), introduced by Baker et al. (2012a,
2012b), has been used in a large number of research papers in its short history.
Researchers have considered uncertainty in the context of economic, monetary and fiscal
policies, and the EPU index is commonly referred to as a good indicator of economic risk.
However, the literature examined does not offer evidence of studies that have integrated
the VIX and the EEU indices in the context of market uncertainty that examines the first
hundred days of the most recent US administrations (Obama and Trump’s first hundred
days in office) in the context of SRIs.
Our research sample is formed by five SRI indices (Calvert US LC Core Responsible, DJ
Sustainability, DJSI World USA subset, DJSI World excluding alcohol, gambling, tobacco
and arms and the MSCI KlD 400 Social); four conventional indices (Dow Jones Industrial,
Nasdaq, Russell 2000 and the S&P 500); the US Treasury Bill (3 months rate); and three
proxies for market uncertainty (EPUi, EEUi and the VIX). The data set for SRI indices and
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the conventional indices were collected from DataStream and MorningStar. The risk-free
rate was downloaded from the US Department of the Treasury, where the daily Treasury
yield curve for three months was selected. As the analysis deals with the performance of SRI
in the US context, all the data were downloaded in US dollars and the most representative
indices were selected to conduct the study. The research sample considers the first hundred
days of the new administration for two US presidents; the first Obama administration and
the Trump administration were considered due to data availability. The research sample
spans from 28 April 2000 to 28 April 2017. Daily prices were downloaded, yielding a total of
4,436 observations. The return series were calculated by estimating the natural logarithm
between two consecutive index prices. An extension of the traditional market model was
implemented to account for excess returns. The model was adjusted with dummy variables
introduced to capture the effects of potential uncertainty generated by the first hundred
days of the Obama and Trump administrations and to capture the impact of the GFC. The
market model was augmented by adding the Economic Policy Uncertainty index (EPUi),
the US Equity Related Economic Uncertainty Index (EEUi) and the implied Volatility
Index (VIX) to measure for market and political risk. The STLFSI (St. Louis Fed Financial
Stress Index) was considered to measure systemic risk as it gauges the degree of financial
stress in the markets. Unfortunately, the index comes as weekly data and did not match the
data frequency selected to support this study. As a result, the VIX was selected as a
substitute variable that reflects market uncertainty. The VIX index measures market
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by stock index option prices. The EPUi is a
news-based equity index that is highly correlated with the widely used market-based equity
volatility index (Ajmi, Aye, Balcilar, El Montasser, & Gupta, 2015). Consequently, when
considering the VIX and the EPUi the results should be quite similar, an approach that
would allow us to cross-check the research outcomes. Standard methodologies testing for
the presence of unit roots (Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips Perron test) were used to ensure
that the series were stationary. A VAR framework was also used to identify the number of
lags to be considered as part of the causality analysis and to ensure that the models were
properly specified. These tests are not reported in this paper as they are standard proce-
dures used when working with time series to ensure data stability properties that are needed
before engaging with econometric modelling. The market models and the causality domain
approach are explained in the discussion that follows.
3.1. Model 1
The first market model considers the basic scenario to help understanding indexes
performances in the context of the GFC, the Obama Administration and the Trump
Administration.
Rit  Rf
  ¼ β0 þ β1 Rmt  Rf þ β2D1t þ β3D2t þ β4D3t þ ε1t (1)
where, Rit, Rmt , Rf refers to the returns for the SRI and the conventional indices, the
benchmark market indices and the risk-free asset (US T-bill). Four benchmark indices are
considered in this study: the Dow Jones Industrial, the NASDAQ Composite, the Russell
2000 and the S&P 500, thus providing a broader view on market performance and at the
same time, helping to identify which index might be causing major disruptions during the
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three sub-periods considered. In order to capture the impact of policy and market
uncertainty the model is augmented to consider the impact of the EPUi, the EEUi and
the VIX index. As a result, three extra dummy variables are introduced in the model to
consider the first hundred days of each new administration and to account for the effects
of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The dummy variable takes a value of one during each
new administration and the GFC period and zero otherwise. As such, the model incorpo-
rates three dummy variables that explore the indices performance under three different
periods: the first dummy variable was introduced to capture the effects of the Global
Financial Crisis (D1tÞ. The second dummy variable capture the first hundred days of the
Obama administration (D2tÞ, and Trump administration is represented by the third
dummy variable (D3tÞ, to help identify whether any abnormal returns were generated.
The models that follow (models 2, 3 and 4) are the augmented versions of model 1,
including the uncertainty indices.
3.2. Model 2 – economic policy uncertainty index
Rit  Rf
  ¼ α10 þ α11 Rmt  Rf þ α12Δ ln EPUið Þ
þ D1t ðδ10 þ δ11 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ12Δln EPUið Þ 
þ D2t ðδ210 þ δ211 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ212Δln EPUið Þ 
þ D3t ðδ310 þ δ311 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ312Δln EPUið Þ þ ε1t
(2)
Model two is the augmented version of model one as it seeks to capture the selected
funds’ performance and how they are affected over the selected period of study in the
context of Economic Policy Uncertainty that is measured by the EPU index. As a result,
the economic policy index is properly integrated in the model to ensure that the index
impact on the funds returns is captured. Furthermore, the model examines indices
performances taken into account the two administrations under consideration and the
effects of the GFC that are represented by the appropriate dummy variables.
3.3. Model 3 – implied volatility
Rit  Rf
  ¼ α20 þ α21 Rmt  Rf þ α22Δ ln VIXð Þ
þ D1t ðδ120 þ δ121 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ122Δln VIXð Þ 
þ D2t ðδ220 þ δ221 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ222Δln VIxð Þ 
þ D3t ðδ320 þ δ321 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ322Δln VIXð Þ þ ε2t
(3)
Model three is the augmented version of model one adjusted to explore the impact of the
implied volatility index. In this case, the model follows the same logic as model two with
the difference that the VIX is the variable that captures market uncertainty and its impact
on the performance of the funds under study.
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3.4. Model 4 – equity economic related uncertainty index
Rit  Rf
  ¼ α30 þ α31 Rmt  Rf þ α32Δ ln EEUið Þ
þ D1t ðδ130 þ δ131 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ132Δln EEUið Þ 
þ D2t ðδ230 þ δ231 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ223Δln EEUið Þ 
þ D3t ðδ330 þ δ331 Rmt  Rf
 þ δ332Δln EEUið Þ þ ε3t
(4)
Model four is the augmented version that considers equity economic related uncertainty
following the same logic presented in model two and three. As in the previous cases, the
augmented versions of the initial econometric model seek to capture specific dynamics
associated with the selected uncertainty indices and as such the model is adjusted to
integrate each relevant index at the time.
3.5. Model 5 – causality domain
Through the frequency domain, the analysis looks at frequency-varying causal effects
across SRI and conventional funds and how they are impacted by economic, equity and
market uncertainty during the selected time period with particular attention given to the
first hundred days of the Obama and Trump administrations, and that this model helps
to capture due to its dynamic behaviour. The main aim is to determine whether SRIs
reacted differently to conventional funds, and how they were impacted by episodes of
remarkable market uncertainty. A brief explanation on the Breitung and Candelon’s
methodology is offered below (for further details, please refer to the authors research
paper). A bivariate causality analysis between the SRI and conventional indices and the
EPUi, VIX and systemic risk is considered as part of the methodological framework. A
bivariate causality analysis in the context of the frequency domain brings further infor-
mation to the indices’ behaviour over the sample period. Breitung and Candelon (2006)
study is based on earlier work by Geweke (1982) and Hosoya (1991) that considered the
two-dimensional vector containing Yt and Xt with a finite-order VAR representative of
order p,
Θ Lð Þ Yt
Xt
 
¼ Θ11 Lð Þ Θ12 Lð Þ
Θ21 Lð Þ Θ22 Lð Þ
 
Yt
Xt
 
¼ εt (5)
where, Θ Lð Þ ¼ I  Θ1L . . . ΘpLp is a 2 × 2 lag polynomial and Θ1; . . . :; Θp are
2 × 2 autoregressive parameter matrices, with LkXt ¼ Xtk and LkYt ¼ Ytk. The error
vector εt is white noise with zero mean and EðεtεttÞ ¼ Σ, where Σ is positive and finite.
The MA representative of the system is
Yt
Xt
 
¼ ψ Lð Þηt ¼
ψ11 Lð Þ ψ12 Lð Þ
ψ21 Lð Þ ψ22 Lð Þ
 
η1t
η2t
 
(6)
with ψ Lð Þηt ¼ Θ Lð Þ1G1 and G is the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky decom-
position G0G ¼ Σ1 such that E ηtη0t
  ¼ I and ηt ¼ Gεt:The causality test developed by
Geweke (1982) can then be written as:
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MX)γ Yð Þ ¼ log 1þ
ψ12 e
iγð Þ 2
ψ11 e
iγð Þ 2
" #
(7)
within this framework no Granger causality from Xt to Yt at frequency γ corresponds to
the condition ψ12 e
iγð Þ 2 ¼ 0. Breitung and Candelon (2006) main contribution is to
show that this condition leads to
Θ12 e
iγ   ¼ jXp
k¼1
Θk;12 cos kγð Þj  i
Xp
k¼1
Θk;12 sin kγð Þj ¼ 0; (8)
where, Θk;12 is the (1,2)th element of Θk, such that a sufficient set of conditions for no
causality is given by
Xp
k¼1
Θk;12 cos kγð Þj ¼ 0 and
Xp
k¼1
Θk;12 sin kγð Þ ¼ 0 (9)
Hence, we can test the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at frequency γ using a
standard F-test for the linear restrictions imposed by the VAR representative of order p,
which follows an F(2, T-2p) distribution for every γ between 0 and π, where T is the
number of observations in the series (Breitung & Candelon, 2006).
This causality test was selected because it is a dynamic test that can measure how the
relationship between variables changes depending on the data frequency considered. As
the study is analysing three main periods – the GFC and the first hundred days of the
Obama and Trump administrations – the use of the spectral causal test is ideal to
determine whether the causal relationship changes depending on the event considered.
4. Results and critical analysis
This section presents the main research findings and associates them with the key issues
identified in the literature review. The analysis starts by outlining the basic details of the
research sample and presenting descriptive statistics that offer some initial information
on the performance of the indices. The discussions are followed by a brief comment on
the basic time series analysis and tests conducted to ensure that the sample complied with
stationarity requirements. The outcomes from the market models and the causality
domain are then presented with some concluding comments on the indices’ volatility.
Table 1 below offers the main details of the variables chosen to support this study and
identifies the time period analysed. The selection of the SRI price indices was conditioned
to data availability and also to the significance of the indices. The indices were filtered
according to their relevance, and to ensure that the initial one hundred days of at least
two presidencies could be analysed1. A sample of four conventional fund price indices
was selected to ensure good representation of traditional funds. Data availability for the
SRI indices determined the sample period that considers the impact of the Global
Financial Crisis and the first hundred days of the first Obama administration and the
1The study sought to examine as many US presidencies as possible, but this was conditioned to data availability. The
research sample ended up examining the first term of the Obama and Trump administration as SRI funds did not have
consistent information for early administrations.
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Trump administration. The risk-free rate was included to ensure that the market model
returns were adjusted accordingly. Three indices measuring economic and financial
uncertainty were integrated into the research framework for robustness purposes. The
indices were selected for their relevance and representativeness in measuring economic
and financial uncertainty.
The analysis of the first hundred days of a first-term presidency of two US presidents
(Barack Obama and Donald Trump) helped to determine whether the performance of
selected SRI Market Indices differed from that of conventional ones. The main research
interest in analysing the first hundred days lies in the belief that during this period a
president’s successes and accomplishments can be measured since this is when their
power and influence are considered to be at their greatest level. It is therefore of interest
to examine whether investors could materialise additional gains from their investments
during the initial days of a new administration, or whether they should be more cautious
because of higher levels of uncertainty that might have a negative impact on their
investment portfolios.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table A1 in the appendix outlines the basic descriptive statistics of the sample. The
results offer interesting insights on the indices’ behaviour over the sample period. Daily
average returns for Calvert, DJIR andMSCI are aligned with the patterns exhibited by the
returns for the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 indices, while DJSIS, DJSIW (excluding
alcohol, gambling, tobacco, and arms) and DJSR returns were slightly lower. The
standard deviation highlighted the NASDAQ and Russell indices as the riskiest over
the period, followed by Calvert, while the rest of the SRI indices had similar volatility
levels to the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial index. The highest Sharpe ratio was
recorded for the Russell 2000 index, which was positive for all the indices except for the
Table 1. Research Sample – 29 April 2000 to 28 April 2017.
SRI Price Index
Conventional
Funds Price Index
US Administration
& GFC Risk Free Rate Uncertainty Indices
DJSI World USA Subset
(DJSIS)
S&P 500 Composite 15 September 2008
to 30 May 2009
Global Financial
Crisis
US T-Bill (3 month) CBOE SPX Volatility
(VIX)
DJSI World excluding alcohol,
gambling, tobacco and
arms (DJSIW)
Dow Jones
Industrial
Barack Obama – 20
January 2009 to
28 April 2009
US Economic Policy
Uncertainty (EPUi)
MSCI KLD 400 Social (MSCI) Nasdaq Composite Donald Trump – 20
January 2017 to
28 April 2017
US Equity Related
Economic
Uncertainty (EEUi)
DJ Sustain North America
(DJS)
Russell 2000
Calvert US LC Core
Responsible (CALVERT)
aThe time period considered is affected by data availability for the SRIs. The research sample ran from 28 April 2000 to 28
April 2017 (4,436 daily observations per series were analysed). Representation of five ethical indices required
accommodating the research sample to data available, which conditioned the number of US administrations that
could be analysed. The first hundred days of the presidency are considered. Thus, the time period spans from 20
January of each term until the end of April of the same year. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) period was identified by
cross checking the performance of the S&P 500, the VIX and the EPUi and EEUi that show how the markets recovery
process started after May 2009 when the S&P 500 started to show an upward trend and the uncertainty indices fell to
lower volatility levels.
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DJSIW. Three SRI indices had higher Sharpe ratios than the NASDAQ, and the ratios for
two of them (Calvert and MSCI) were in a similar range to that of the S&P 500.
The correlation matrix (see Table A2 in the appendix) indicates high positive correla-
tion between the returns on SRI and the conventional stock market indices. The lowest
correlations were found for the DJSIW index, which had the lowest average daily return
over the period, with a standard deviation matching that of the Dow Jones Industrial.
This was the only index with a negative Sharpe ratio, indicating that the return on the
index was below the US-T Bill. These results show that DJSIW did not offer its investors
appropriate returns when its risk level is taken into consideration. It is noteworthy that
once “sin” activities are removed from the index, its performance drops significantly.
4.2. Model outcomes
The first market model (Equation 1 – Table A3 in the appendix) identifies Calvert, DJSIS,
DJS and MSCI as indices that outperform the Dow Jones Industrial with beta coefficients
higher than one. Not surprisingly, DJSIW is associated with the lower beta coefficient,
while the Calvert index reports a higher beta. When the NASDAQ, Russell 2000 and S&P
500 are used as the market return to measure for systemic risk, the results of the market
model show beta coefficients lower than one in every case for the SRI indices, with the
exception of Calvert in the context of the S&P 500 index. The coefficient for the dummy
variable that considers the impact of the Global Financial Crisis shows that each index
was negatively affected. However, with the dummy variable considering the first hundred
days of the Obama administration only Calvert, DJS and MSCI appeared to be positively
impacted, while the coefficients for the dummy variable capturing the first hundred days
of the Trump administration were insignificant. These results suggest that SRI also aligns
with the belief that markets prefer a Democratic president.
The results from market model 2 (see Table A5 in the appendix), which incorporates
the EPU index, show that the EPU index is insignificant in every case, the only exception
being the DJS when the S&P 500 is used as a proxy for market returns. Calvert and MSCI
outperform the Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500, while DJSIS outperforms the Dow
Jones Industrial with registered beta coefficients higher than one. In the rest of the cases
the beta coefficients are below one with the lowest outcomes registered when the
NASDAQ is the proxy for the market return. The dummy variable for the GFC period
suggests that only the DJS index was negatively affected, as the coefficients for the rest of
the indices were insignificant. The results for the Obama administration show weak
evidence of an impact on the indices, as coefficients were found to be significant at the ten
percent level on only five occasions, and results are mixed for DJS and Calvert, which
appear to be positively impacted, while DJSIW and DJSIS were impacted negatively. The
results for the Trump administration showed a negative impact on the indices: again, the
significance was quite low and only Calvert and DJS (when the S&P 500 is the proxy for
the market return) reported negative and significant coefficients, reflecting a negative
effect of the Trump administration on these indices.
The results from the augmented market model 4, considering market uncertainty
from the EEUi index (see Table A4 in the appendix), confirm that Calvert, DJSIS and
MSCI outperform the market in the context of the Dow Jones Industrial, and that Calvert
and MSCI have a beta coefficient greater than one for the case of the S&P 500 market
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return. For the rest of the cases, the SRI indices are lower than one with particularly low
results when the NASDAQ is considered as the market return. One interesting outcome
is found when the EEUi economic uncertainty is introduced in the model. This variable
appeared to be insignificant, and in the selected cases where a significant coefficient was
recorded the outcome was quite weak (significant at the ten percent level). The results
also show that the Global Financial Crisis had a negative impact on Calvert and DJSIS in
the context of the Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500. However, the Obama and
Trump administrations did not seem to have any impact on the behaviour of the SRI
indices.
When adjusted for implied volatility (VIX), the augmented market model shows some
interesting findings (see Table A6 in the appendix). Here, the reported beta coefficients are
lower than one for every case with the exception of Calvert when the S&P 500 is the proxy
for market returns. The dummy variable that captures the impact of the VIX indicates that
implied volatility has a negative effect on each of the SRI indices and a positive effect was
found only in three cases when the S&P 500 is the proxy for market returns. This model
reported a positive and significant impact on SRI indices during the first days of the Obama
administration with positive coefficients when the Dow Jones is the market proxy, and on
two occasions (Calvert and MCSI) when the S&P 500 is the market proxy. During the first
days of the Trump administration the coefficients are insignificant for every case.
As in Humphrey et al.’s (2016) study, there were no meaningful differences on return
estimates, corroborating the idea that SRI indices should be considered neither better nor
worse than conventional indices. The results also align with findings from Lean and
Nguyen (2014) indicating that the Global Financial Crisis impacted on the performance
of sustainable investment, while the US policy uncertainty index does not seem to be
significant. And finally, it appears that the Trump administration did not have any
significant effect on SRI indices, whereas the opposite is true for the Obama administra-
tion; this is an interesting result considering that the first days of the Obama adminis-
tration were heavily impacted by the GFC.
4.3. Causality in domain frequency findings
The causality domain model was estimated after examining the existence of a cointegra-
tion relationship between the indices analysed (see Table A7 in the appendix). The
outcomes from the cointegration tests show no long-term relationship between the SRI
and conventional indices. On the other hand, the SRI indices showed evidence of a long-
run relationship with the three indices measuring market uncertainty. These outcomes
are considered when implementing the causality domain analysis. The Akaike informa-
tion criterion was selected as the lag selection criterion when performing the causality test
in the context of long-run relationship and no relationship. As in Breitung and Candelon
(2006), to assess the statistical significance of the causal relationship between stock
market index returns, the causality measure for the frequency ω is compared to the 5%
critical value of a χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom (5.99). The domain causality
results are presented in the appendix (see Figures 1–5).The results do not confirm the
existence of causality between Calvert and the VIX, with findings that are also insignif-
icant for the EEUi, while EPUi has a dynamic relationship, highlighting a short-term
impact during the initial days of the Obama and Trump administrations. The market
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index S&P 500 has an impact on the behaviour of Calvert during the GFC and the early
days of the Obama administration. In the case of DJSIS, the EPUi has a short causal effect
during the Obama administration period, while no significant causal relationship was
found for the EEUi and the VIX. The results of causal effects from conventional indices
suggest that DJSIS is not affected by any of the conventional funds in the short run. In the
case of DJSIW the results show no evidence of causal relationships from the EPUi, EEUi
and VIX. Only in the case of the S&P 500 was a short-term causal effect found during the
GFC and the Obama administration. For MSCI there is no significant evidence of causal
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Figure 1. Domain causality – Calvert.
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Figure 2. Domain Causality – DJSI.
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 567
relationships from the proxies for market uncertainty, while the outcomes for causal
effects from conventional funds show that the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 have a short-
term effect on the performance of the index during the GFC period, and a longer-term
effect registered from the S&P 500. In the case of DJSR the results show a short causal
Figure 3. Domain Causality – DJSI2.
Figure 4. Domain Causality – MSCI.
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effect from EPUi during the Obama administration period with insignificant causal
effects from the EEUi and the VIX. The S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 indices have a
causal effect on the DJSR, with the S&P 500 having a persistence effect during the GFC,
although no causal effect is recorded during the Trump administration.
The results for realised volatility show high levels of volatility around the period of the
GFC, with patterns highlighting the DJS, DJSIS and the DJSW indices as more instable
over the period, showing evidence of more persistence episodes that seem quite remark-
able in the case of the DJSW index. On the other hand, Calvert and MSCI volatility
behaviour aligns with that of the Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500. These findings
contradict Abdelsalam et al.’s (2014) conclusions that SRIs are associated with more
stable patterns, as their volatility seems to replicate the behaviour of conventional indices
(see Figure 6 in the appendix for realised volatility).
The main research outcomes can be summarised as follows:
(1) The EPUi and EEUi appear to be insignificant, confirming that the economic
policy uncertainty index does not add further understanding of the behaviour of
SRI indices and how they might be reacting to periods of economic and financial
uncertainty. On the other hand, the VIX seems to be a better metric to consider
market sentiment and investors reaction to risk as this variable was significant in
almost every case and appeared to have a negative impact on the performance of
SRI over the analysed period.
(2) SRI indices have lower returns than conventional indices and in general they are
associated with volatility levels that tally with patterns exhibited by the Dow Jones
Industrial and the S&P 500.
(3) Registered beta coefficients indicate that in general, SRI indices underperform
their conventional counterparts apart from Calvert and MSCI, which seem to
Figure 5. Domain Causality – DJS.
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perform better when the Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500 are used as proxies
for the market return.
(4) The causality domain analysis suggested that the GFC had a significant effect on
the SRI indices, with the S&P 500 index having a more defined influence on the
behaviour of the SRI indices over the period.
(5) The analysis of realised volatility shows that in general, SRI indices react to market
uncertainty in a similar way to their conventional peers. The case of DJSW is excep-
tional as it appeared to exhibit higher levels of instability and longer persistence effects.
In sum, when considering the power of SRI in the context of market uncertainty, it seems
that this type of fund does not offer real opportunities to investors, as they underperform
well-established indices like the Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500. SRI appears to be
associated with a “feel good” concept of investing while sacrificing financial gains, an
approach that appears to be incongruent with the basic principles of portfolio theory,
which seek to maximise expected returns based on a given level of market risk.
5. Conclusions and further research
This study compares the performance of five SRI indices (Calvert US LC Core Responsible,
DJ Sustainability, DJSI World USA subset, DJSI World excluding alcohol, gambling,
tobacco and arms and the MSCI KlD 400 Social) with selected unscreened conventional
counterparts (Dow Jones Industrial, NASDAQ, Russell 2000 and the S&P 500). The results
suggest that in general SRI indices underperform conventional indices, and that the S&P
500 index fund has the strongest impact on their behaviour. The study also considered
market volatility and political uncertainty using the VIX, EEU and EPU indices as
Figure 6. Realised Volatility.
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indicators. The VIX is identified as the best indicator to capture market uncertainty, with
insignificant results for the EPU index (EPUi) and the EEU index (EEUi).
Overall, our results reveal that once the EPUi is included in the model, both conventional
and SRI market indices incorporate the level of implied volatility relatively quickly when a
shift in the political party occurs, as the Trump administration led to a negative impact on
both indices. However, a weak and positive relation was identified for the Obama adminis-
tration, indicating a gradual impact on SRI indices under his presidency. Additionally, this
effect is observed in an augmented market model adjusted for implied volatility (VIX), thus
observing a more pronounced positive and significant impact on SRI indices during the first
hundred days of the Obama administration. The results confirm that the market prefers a
Democratic presidency, specifically in the case of the SRI stockmarket, and it opens a window
of opportunity to break the impasse in extreme economic conditions, such as the GFC.
In addition, the causality in domain frequency findings shed light on the lack of any
relationship between SRI indices and their conventional counterparts. In tune with earlier
results, the Obama administration only reports a clear short-term causal effect for the S&P
500 and only the DJSR has a weak causal effect with the EPUi. Furthermore, other indices
analysed such as DJS, DJSIS and DJSW yield to higher levels of instability over the period
that coincided with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), during which the stock market was
characterised by high levels of volatility and aligned with the Obama administration.
This study provides insights on SRI performance and behaviour when markets are
exposed to unexpected events, such as GFC and changes in presidential administrations.
To gain more robustness in the implied volatility analysis, selected conventional market
indices were considered and although previous literature seems to attribute a major
stability to the SRI, our results reveal similar patterns across all indices during the period
analysed. It seems that only the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial conventional indices
are aligned with Calvert and MSCI, but DJS, DJSIS and especially DJSIW seems to give a
stronger reaction to the instability of the market. This analysis covers stock market
reactions to key economic events, such as GFC and the first hundred days of a pre-
sidential term, in the case of responsible investing, an issue that has barely been
approached in literature. Due to the increasing importance of SRI in the context of the
US and internationally, further empirical research is needed in conjunction with the
development of cross-country samples in order to understand how market indices react
to combinations of extreme implied volatility and political uncertainty. A natural direc-
tion for future research includes rethinking the Democratic versus Republican Party
puzzle and its implications for the stock market volatility.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Lucía Morales is a scholar in the College of Business at Technological University Dublin. She is an
active researcher in the areas of Time Series, Economics, Finance and Education. She teaches in the
fields of Economics, Finance, Financial Economics, and Econometrics at postgraduate and doc-
toral level.
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 571
Amparo Soler-Domínguez is Lecturer of Financial Economics at the University Jaume I (Castellón,
Spain). Her main research field is the performance analysis of mutual funds from a nonparametric
perspective, in which she has been applying traditional, but also innovative, operational research
methodologies to assess the efficiency, determinants and persistence of mutual funds. She has been
a visiting researcher at the University of Leicester, the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute of the
Open University of Catalonia and the Dublin Institute of Technology. She has co-written papers
published in specialized journals, such as Omega, Business Ethics: a European Review, The North
American Journal of Economics and Finance, ACM Computing Surveys, Journal of Cleaner
Production, Finance Research Letters, Journal of Operational Research Society, Journal of
Applied Economics and Applied Economics Letters, among others and she has presented the
results of her investigations in several international conferences.
James Hanly is a Senior Lecturer in the College of Business at Technological University Dublin
(Ireland). He holds a PhD and an MS.c in Finance from University College Dublin and a BBS
(Finance) from Dublin City University. His research interests focus on asset pricing, risk manage-
ment and volatility modelling in energy, financial and commodity markets. He is also interested in
experiential learning and management dynamics and how research can inform and help develop
management practice.
References
Aastveit, K., Natvik, G. J., & Sola, S. (2013). Economic Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of
Monetary Policy. Oslo, Norway: Norges Bank Working Paper.
Abdelsalam, O., Duygun, M., Matallin-Saez, J. C., & Tortosa-Ausina, E. (2014). Do ethics imply
persistence? The case of Islamic and socially responsible funds. Journal of Banking and Finance,
40, 182–194.
Ajmi, A. N., Aye, G. C., Balcilar, M., El Montasser, G., & Gupta, R. (2015). Causality between US
economic policy and equity market uncertainties: Evidence from linear and nonlinear tests.
Journal ofApplied Economics, 18(2), 225–246.
Alam, N., & Rajjaque, M. S. (2010). Shariah-compliant equities: Empirical evaluation of perfor-
mance in the European market during credit crunch. Journal of Financial Services Marketing,
15, 228–240.
Baker, S., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2012a). Measuring economic policy uncertainty. University of
Chicago and Stanford University. Retrieved from www.policyuncertainty.com
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2012b). Has economic policy uncertainty hampered the
recovery?. In L. E. Ohanian, J. B. Taylor, & I. J. Wright (Eds.), Government policies and the
delayed economic recovery (pp. 39–56). Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, R. N., & Davis, S. J. (2015). Measuring economic policy uncertainty (NBER
working paper series). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w21633
Bello, Z. (2005). Socially responsible investing and portfolio diversification. Journal of Financial
Research, 28(1), 41–57.
Belo, F., Gala, V. D., & Jun, L. (2011). Government spending, political cycles, and the cross-section
of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2), 305–324.
Breitung, J., & Candelon, B. (2006). Testing for short-and long-run causality: A frequency-domain
approach. Journal of Econometrics, 132(2), 363_378.
Consolandi, C., Jaiswal-Dale, A., Poggiani, E., & Vercelli, A. (2009). Global standards and ethical
stock indexes: The case of the Dow Jones sustainability Stoxx Index. Journal of Business Ethics,
87, 185–197.
Cooper, M. J., McConnell, J. J., & Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2006). The other January effect. Journal of
Financial Economics, 82, 315–341.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index© [STLFSI], Retrieved from
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI
572 L. MORALES ET AL.
Fernandez-Izquierdo, A., &Matallin-Saez, J. (2008). Performance of ethical mutual funds in Spain:
Sacrifice or premium? Journal of Business Ethics, 81, 247–260.
Forte, G., & Miglietta, F. (2007). Islamic mutual funds as faith-based funds in a socially responsible
context. Technical report, social science research network. O. Abdelsalam et al. Journal of
Banking & Finance, 40(2014), 182–194 193.
Geczy, C. C., Stambaugh, R. F., & Levin, D. (2003). Investing in socially responsible mutual funds.
Working Paper Wharton School.
Geweke, J. (1982). Measurement of linear dependence and feedback between multiple time series.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77(378), 304–324.
Gil-Bazo, J., Ruiz-Verdu, P., & Santos, A. A. P. (2009). The performance of socially responsible mutual
funds: The role of fees and management companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 94, 243–263.
Goldreyer, E. F., & Diltz, J. D. (1999). The performance of socially responsible mutual funds:
Incorporating socio-political information in portfolio selection.Managerial Finance, 25(1), 23–36.
Gregory, A., Matatko, J., & Luther, R. (1997). Ethical unit trust financial performance: Small
company effects and fund size effects. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24(5), 705–724.
Hamilton, S., Jo, H., & Statman, M. (1993). Doing well while doing good? The investment
performance of socially responsible mutual funds. Financial Analysts Journal, 49(6), 62–66.
Hosoya, Y. (1991). The decomposition and measurement of the interdependence between second-
order stationary processes. Probability Theory and Related Fields, 88, 429–444.
Humphrey, J. E., Warren, G., & Boon, J. (2016). What is different about socially responsible funds?
A holdings-based analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 138, 293–297.
Jones, S. T., & Banning, K. (2009). US elections and monthly stock market returns. Journal of
Economics and Finance, 33(3), 273–287.
Ko, J. H., & Lee, C. M. (2015). International economic policy uncertainty and stock prices: Wavelet
approach. Economics Letters, 134, 118–122.
Lean, H. H., & Nguyen, D. K. (2014). Policy uncertainty and performance characteristics of
sustainable investments across regions around the global financial crisis. Applied Financial
Economics, 24(21), 1367–1373.
Li, X.-M., Zhang, B., & Gao, R. (2015). Economic policy uncertainty shocks and stock–Bond
correlations: Evidence from the US market. Economics Letters, 132, 91–96.
Luther, R. G., Matatko, J., & Corner, D. (1992). The investment performance of UK ethical unit
trusts. Accounting. Auditing and Accountability Journal, 5(4), 57–70.
Lyn, E. O., & Zychowicz, E. J. (2010). The impact of faith-based screens on investment perfor-
mance. The Journal of Investing, 19, 136–143.
Mallin, C. A., Saadouni, B., & Briston, R. J. (1995). The financial performance of ethical investment
funds. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 22(4), 483–496.
Renneboog, L., Horst, J., & Zhang, C. (2008). The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The
performance of socially responsible mutual funds. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 302–322.
Revelli, C., & Viviani, J.-L. (2015). Financial performance of Socially Responsible Investing
(SRI): What have we learnined? A meta-analysis. Business Ethics: A European Review, 24(2),
159–185.
Santa-Clara, P., & Valkanov, R. (2003). The presidential puzzle: Political cycles and the stock
market. The Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1841–1872.
Scheffel, E. M. (2015). Accounting for the political uncertainty factor. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 3, 1048–1064.
Scrabic, B. P., & Soric, P. (2017). A note on the “economic policy uncertainty index”. Social
Indicators Research. doi:10.1007/s11205-017-1609-1
Sturm, R. (2009). The “other” January effect and the presidential election cycle. Applied Financial
Economics, 19, 1355–1363.
Sturm, R. R., & Field, C. M. (2018). Benchmark error and socially responsible investments. Global
Finance Journal, 38, 24–29.
Tsai, I.-C. (2017). The source of global stock market risk: A viewpoint of economic policy
uncertainty. Economic Modelling, 60, 122–131.
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 573
US SIF Foundation (2016). The forum for sustainable and responsible investment. 2016 Trends
and Report Highlights. Retrieved from http://www.ussif.org/files/Trends/US%20SIF%202016%
20Trends%20Overview.pdf
Wagner, A., Zeckhauser, R., & Ziegler, A. (2017). Company stock reactions to the 2016 election
shock: Trump, taxes and trade (Faculty Research Working Paper Series. RWP17–005). Harvard
Kennedy School. Retrieved from https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/
Index.aspx
Wang, Y., Chen, C. R., & Huang, Y. S. (2014). Economic policy uncertainty and corporate
investment: Evidence from China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 26, 227–243.
Zhang, G., Han, J., Pan, Z., & Huang, H. (2015). Economic policy uncertainty and capital structure
choice: Evidence from China. Economic Systems, 39(3), 439–457.
574 L. MORALES ET AL.
A
p
p
en
d
ix
Ta
bl
e
A
1.
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
is
tic
s
of
D
ai
ly
Re
tu
rn
s.
CA
LV
ER
TR
D
JI
R
D
JS
IS
R
D
JS
IW
R
D
JS
R
M
SC
IR
N
AS
D
AQ
R
RU
SS
EL
LR
SP
50
0R
M
ea
n
0.
01
01
%
0.
01
51
%
0.
00
45
%
0.
00
22
%
0.
00
62
%
0.
01
04
%
0.
01
01
%
0.
02
29
%
0.
01
12
%
St
d.
D
ev
.
1.
28
%
1.
12
%
1.
21
%
1.
12
%
1.
18
%
1.
21
%
1.
55
%
1.
50
%
1.
20
%
Sk
ew
ne
ss
−
0.
09
02
23
−
0.
06
42
95
−
0.
24
91
47
−
0.
26
52
09
−
0.
20
18
21
−
0.
09
58
96
0.
11
22
92
−
0.
27
54
32
−
0.
19
18
39
Ku
rt
os
is
10
.1
29
94
11
.9
40
51
9.
62
33
21
10
.2
05
34
10
.5
92
87
10
.8
76
29
9.
09
77
25
8.
02
78
75
12
.0
43
19
Ja
rq
ue
-B
er
a
94
00
.0
94
14
,7
73
.9
4
81
52
.3
93
96
45
.8
09
10
,6
83
.6
5
11
,4
70
.5
2
68
80
.2
91
47
27
.5
21
15
,1
39
.3
2
Sh
ar
pe
Ra
tio
0.
00
47
0.
00
97
0.
00
03
−
0.
00
18
0.
00
17
0.
00
51
0.
00
38
0.
01
25
0.
00
58
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
44
35
44
35
44
35
44
35
44
35
44
35
44
35
44
35
44
35
a
Sh
ar
pe
Ra
tio
=
(M
ea
n
po
rt
fo
lio
re
tu
rn
–
Ri
sk
fr
ee
ra
te
)/
St
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
po
rt
fo
lio
re
tu
rn
SR
¼
r p
r
f
σ p
w
he
re
,r
p
¼
ex
pe
ct
ed
po
rt
fo
lio
re
tu
rn
,r
f
¼
ris
kf
re
er
at
e,
σ
p
¼
po
rt
fo
lio
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 575
Table A2. Correlation matrix.
Correlations CALVERTR DJIR DJSISR DJSIWR DJSR MSCIR NASDAQR RUSELLR SP500R
CALVERTR 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.73 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.98
DJIR 1.00 0.95 0.73 0.96 0.96 0.83 0.86 0.97
DJSISR 1.00 0.75 0.97 0.96 0.88 0.87 0.97
DJSIWR 1.00 0.77 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.75
DJSR 1.00 0.98 0.90 0.87 0.98
MSCIR 1.00 0.92 0.90 0.99
NASDAQR 1.00 0.88 0.90
RUSSELLR 1.00 0.90
SP500R 1.00
Table A3. Market model 1.
Market Model 1 – Dow Jones Industrial β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
CALVERT −0.0001 1.071746* −0.00076*** 0.00239* 0.0000
DJSIS −0.0001 1.015682* −0.000887** 0.0017 0.0004
DJSIW −0.0001 0.723922* −0.0009 0.0017 0.0006
DJS −0.0001 1.005887* −0.0004 0.00118** −0.0002
MSCI −0.0001 1.031226* −0.000554*** 0.001811* −0.0001
Market Model 1 -Nasdaq β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
CALVERT 0.0000 0.774769* −0.000881** 0.0009 −0.0002
DJSIS 0.0000 0.687326* −0.001153** 0.0005 0.0003
DJSIW 0.0000 0.477646* −0.0012 0.0010 0.0006
DJS 0.0000 0.689598* −0.0007 0.0000 −0.0004
MSCI 0.0000 0.716162* −0.000764*** 0.0005 −0.0002
Market Model 1 – Russell 2000 β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
CALVERT −0.0001 0.77634* −0.0004 0.0012 0.0004
DJSIS −0.0001 0.698062* −0.0007 0.0008 0.0009
DJSIW −0.0001 0.49553* −0.0008 0.0011 0.0010
DJS −0.0001 0.688714* −0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
MSCI −0.0001 0.729515* −0.0003 0.0008 0.0004
Market Model 1 -SP500 β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
CALVERT 0.0000 1.045562* −0.0003 0.001113* 0.0000
DJSIS −0.0001 0.969108* −0.000511*** 0.0005 0.0005
DJSIW −0.0001 0.693014* −0.0007 0.0009 0.0007
DJS 0.0000 0.963531* −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0001
MSCI 0.0000 0.995673* −0.000137** 0.0006 0.0000
Levels of significance are recorded as follows: * 1% significance level, **5% significance level; ***10% significance level.
The coefficients values are reported, and the asterisk denotes the level of significance according to recorded p-values.
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Table A7. Cointegration tests (Causality domain model).
CALVERT Dow Jones Industrial Nasdaq Russell 2000 S&P 500 EPUi EEUi VIX
Johansen Cointegration Test
DJSIS No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
DJSIW No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
DJS No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
MSCI No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
Engle-Granger Cointegration Test
DJSIS No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
DJSIW No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
DJS No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
MSCI No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
PhilipsOulairis Cointegration Test
DJSIS No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
DJSIW No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
DJS No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
MSCI No No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
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